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Abstract
We examine the impact of seller’s Property Condition Disclosure Law on the
residential real estate values. A disclosure law may address the information asymmetry in housing transactions shifting of risk from buyers and brokers to the sellers and raising housing prices as a result. We combine propensity score techniques from the treatment effects literature with a traditional event study approach.
We assemble a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for a quarterly
panel of 291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 50 US States spanning 21 years from 1984 to 2004 is used to exploit the MSA level variation in
house prices. The study finds that the average seller may be able to fetch a higher
price (about three to four percent) for the house if she furnishes a state-mandated
seller.s property condition disclosure statement to the buyer. When we compare
the results from parametric and semi-parametric event analyses, we find that the
semi-parametric or the propensity score analysis generals moderately larger estimated effects of the law on housing prices.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C14, K11, L85, R21
Keywords: Property Condition Disclosure, Housing Price Index, Propensity
Score Matching, Event Study
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It is well understood that resale markets with asymmetric information create a lemon’s problem
where owners have an incentive to keep products with above average quality on factors that are
unobservable in the market and to sell products that have below average quality (Akerloff, 1970).
Used automobile markets (Offer, 2007; Bond, 2002), resale of aircraft (Gilligan, 2004), owneroccupied housing markets, and even the market for securitized debt might suffer from this
lemon’s problem (Van Order, 2006; Glaeser and Kallal, 1997). A possible solution to this
problem is government imposed seller disclosure and seller liability for known, undisclosed
defects, which provides redress to buyers once they have taken possession of the property and
have the opportunity to obtain private information concerning product quality (Fishman and
Hagerty, 2003).1

The application of this solution to residential property markets was brought to public attention by
the path-breaking 1984 California appellate court verdict, which made the case for requiring a
seller's disclosure statement in residential real estate transactions.2 Since that time, 34 state
governments or courts have imposed seller disclosure requirements on the market for residential
property. Several studies have documented the rationale and effect of seller disclosure laws
including Zumpano and Johnson (2003) who find based on insurance claims that 76% of all suits
against real estate salespeople involve the condition of the property, Nanda (2008) who finds a
link between the number of disciplinary actions of against real estate agents and the adoption of
disclosure laws, and finally Moore and Smolen (2000) who find that customer dissatisfaction
dropped with the adoption of such laws.3

1

Anti-lemon laws in the automobile industry provide an example of an alternative approach for addressing
this problem (Shaffer and Ostas, 2001).
2
Easton v. Strassburger (152 Cal.App.3d 90, 1984) was a California Appellate Court decision that
expanded the duty of realtors and the grounds for realtor negligence in selling faulty homes.
3
See Lefco (2004) for a detailed discussion of the implementation of seller disclosure laws, and Pancak,
Miceli, and Sirmans (1996) for a discussion of real estate broker incentives concerning the adoption of
seller disclosure laws.
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This paper examines whether the adoption of seller disclosure laws over the last two decades has
reduced the magnitude of the asymmetric information problem in residential property markets.
Following Akerlof’s (1970) ‘lemons’ paper, the average selling price of homes is reduced by the
presence of asymmetric information as buyers adapt to the expectation that higher quality homes
will be held off the market. If seller disclosure laws reduce the asymmetric information problem,
housing prices should rise in response leading to an ‘abnormal return’ on real estate following the
adoption of such laws. Accordingly, we treat the adoption of seller disclosure laws as an ‘event’
and test whether ‘abnormal returns’ can be detected following state adoption.

Specifically, this paper conducts both a traditional event study and a modified propensity score
analysis to examine whether the adoption of seller disclosure laws creates temporary abnormal
returns as prices adjust in response to a reduction in the lemons problem in the sale of owneroccupied housing.

The event study methodology assumes that the market is efficient in

assimilating new information and can detect the extent of re-pricing due to the event by
examining whether returns on assets are unusually high immediately following the event, an
“abnormal return”. Since Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), a myriad of papers in finance
have applied the event study methodology including recent applications such as the effect of coal
industry cartels (Bittner, 2005), the Japanese banking crisis (Miyajima and Yafeh, 2007), and the
effect of corporate spin-off announcements (Veld and Veld, In Press). More specifically, in real
estate, Brau and Holmes (2006) examine the effect of stock repurchase announcements by Real
Estate Investment Trusts, and Fuerst (2005) examines the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the New
York office market.

Event studies are most commonly applied in contexts where a market index provides a
benchmark for comparing the returns from the assets that have been affected by an event. In
cases where the affected assets are a large share of the market, however, a reasonable alternative

3

is to use returns for the segment of the market that is unaffected by the event as a benchmark.
This alternative benchmark illustrates the similarity between event studies and the standard
treatment effects literature typically found in labor economics (Heckman and Hotz, 1989). A
common concern in the treatment effects literature is systematic selection of individuals into
either the treatment or control group, and in this literature propensity score models provide a
standard solution for bias caused by a complex, non-linear process of selection on observables
(Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997 and 1998; Smith and Todd,
2000). Naturally, in the context of an event study, the traditional propensity score approach must
be modified to allow for across time variation in the likelihood of the event.

Specifically, this paper examines whether the adoption of property disclosure laws leads to an
increased rate of housing appreciation using a quarterly panel of housing price indices from the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) for 291 US Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs) and 50 US States spanning 21 years from 1984 to 2004. The impact of law
adoption is estimated using both a standard event study based on traditional parametric panel data
models, as well as semi-parametric propensity score matching model that is adapted to an event
study framework by using a proportional hazard model of event occurrence or law adoption as the
link function rather than a standard binary choice model of receipt of treatment. We find a robust
positive effect of the seller’s Property Condition Disclosure Law on property values especially for
the propensity score model. The results suggest that the average seller may be able to fetch a
higher price (about three to four percent) for the house if she furnishes a state-mandated seller’s
Property Condition Disclosure statement to the buyer.

Rest of the study proceeds as follows Section 2 discusses the parametric panel estimation
methods, the semi-parametric propensity score approach, and finally the standard event study.
Section 3 provides the description of the economic and institutional variables, Section 4 analyzes,
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compares, and contrasts the results from different econometric models, and finally, we conclude
in Section 5.

2 Methodology

At the onset of an empirical analysis of the impact of a law adoption, we face the choice between
treating adoption as a one-time shock to the housing market or a shock that persists over several
years. Unlike a disclosure that describes past financial outcomes, the adoption of a law may be
followed by a period of uncertainty where individuals learn about the impact of the law over time,
and the total impact of the law on asset prices may not be realized for several years. For example,
rational buyers and sellers might gradually learn about the effectiveness of the law in bringing
about the desired transparency in property transactions over time gaining confidence in the
quality of the resulting housing units on the market (buyers) and in the fairness of prices obtained
for housing units marketed with full disclosure. Figure (1) provides a diagrammatic exposition on
the slow adjustment (dotted line in the figure) in buyers’ perception of the effectiveness of the
disclosure law. In order to test the length of the slow adjustment empirically, we use
specifications with different lengths or windows for duration of the shock or the period of
“abnormal returns”.
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Figure 1 Movement of Housing Price Index at the level

2.1 Parametric Approaches to Ascertain the Effect on Property Values
We start with typical event study using traditional panel data procedures. Our model in equation 1
uses index i for MSA, j for state, t for quarter-year. The terms ωt and σi capture the quarter-year
fixed effect and the MSA fixed effect, respectively. The dependent variable is the percentage
change in Yit where Yit is the Housing Price Index (HPI); Xit is a vector of economic
characteristics of the MSA; Zjt is a vector of economic and institutional characteristics of the
state;

ε

it

is the error term, and S jt is a binary variable that is one if the law has been adopted

immediately preceding period t so that (Sjt - Sjt-s) takes on a value of 1 for s years (our event
window) immediately following the adoption of the law.4

4

The economic controls are standard in the literature on housing price volatility, see Miller and Peng
(2005). We include the state-level institutional characteristics to control for the fact that such variables
might be correlated with both law adoption and unobservables that correlate with housing price
appreciation, but naturally we do not expect these controls to have a causal effect on housing prices.
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 Y it − Y it −1

 Y it −1


 ≡ y it = α X it + β Z


jt

+ δ ( S jt − S jt − s ) + σ i + ω t + ε it

(1)

In this model, the quarter-year fixed effects capture housing price appreciation over time and act
δ

as the market benchmark for the event study. The parameter

captures quarter-by-quarter

whether housing price appreciation during a metropolitan area’s event window differs
systematically from housing price appreciation during other periods. This specification acts as an
event study with or without the MSA fixed effects. However, the MSA fixed effects assure that
models are identified based on difference in appreciation rates within an MSA after controlling
for national housing appreciation rates in that quarter. As such, the model controls for observable
and unobservable time-invariant differences across states that might influence both the likelihood
of ever adopting the law and metropolitan specific housing price appreciation rates.

While standard errors are robust to serial correlation, the specif ication in equation (1) does not
impose any specific assumptions about serial correlation in error structure, and in the current
context, the unobservables especially those related to institutional structure may persist over time.
Accordingly, we consider alternative GLS specification in which we eliminate MSA fixed effects
via first differencing and allow the first difference error structure to fol low the following possible
patterns: no autocorrelation, same AR(1) across MSA’s, and MSA-specific AR(1).

2.2 Semi-Parametric Approaches to Ascertain the Effect on Property Values
Propensity score matching method developed in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) provides a
competing approach to analyze the effect of a treatment (in our case, adoption of disclosure law)
on an outcome variable (i.e. percentage change in HPI). Propensity score methods have been
extensively applied in program evaluation literature within labor economics (Dehejia and Wahba,
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1999; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997 and 1998; Smith and Todd, 2000). The reasons why
we use the propensity score approach to compare and contrast with the parametric estimation
methods are three-fold, also noted in Slottje et al. (2005): (1) the propensity score approach
imposes fewer assumptions about the distribution of the data, it permits non-parametric
interactions among all the covariates in determining the outcome (i.e. selection on observables), it
ascertains the mean impact of treatment on the treated within a group of ‘very similar’ units. As
opposed to parametric approaches that consider all the units to infer an effect size.

The motivation of propensity score matching methods can be summarized as follows: In
observational studies, the units are assigned to treatment and control groups in a highly non-linear
manner. Therefore, even in models that include parametric controls for all variables that influence
selection, treatment effect estimates will be biased by the unknown, non-linear selection process.
Propensity score matching is based on the idea that the bias is reduced when the comparison of
mean impact is performed using treated and control units, which are similar on the observables
that influence selection. The propensity score acts as an index on which the matching can be
performed since it is generally not feasible to match on an n-dimensional vector of characteristics
(Becker and Ichino, 2002). More formally, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) define the propensity
score as the conditional probability of receiving a treatment given a vector of pre-treatment
characteristics:

[

P ( Z j ) ≡ Pr[ S j = 1] = E S i | Z j

]

(2)

where Sj = {0, 1} is the treatment dummy, and Xj is a vector of pre-treatment attributes.

Our parameter of interest is the mean effect of treatment (MET) on the treated units defined as:5

5

See Todd (1999) for a discussion on this and other matching estimators.
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MET S =1 =

1
N S j =1

∑ y j ( X j ) − E[ y j | P (γZ j ), S j

= 0]

(3)

∀i∈S j =1

where yj is the outcome of interest and the expected value of yj for Sj=0 is estimated based on yk
for k’s that have the same likelihood of treatment as k and for which S k=0.

As described in Becker and Ichino (2002), the first step in obtaining estimates of treatment effects
using a propensity score model is to estimate the likelihood of treatment and predict the
likelihood of treatment for each observation typically using a standard discrete choice model like
the Logit or Probit often referred to as the link function. However, in our context, the property
condition disclosure law is adopted by different states at different points in time with events (law
adoptions) occurring at various times rather than simply a single treatment. The probability for
law adoption varies across states as well as time i.e. a disparate treatment exists. The fundamental
assumption in logit and probit models that the probability approaches zero and one at the same
rate is not tenable since the law has been adopted by different states in different time. According
to Clarke, Courchane, and Roy (2005), use of a symmetric link function (i.e. inverse of the
cumulative distribution function) like logit or probit would extend bias when such disparate
treatment exists and is not capable of capturing the variations over time. A good alternative for
our problem is the complimentary log-log model that incorporates an asymmetric link function.6
{comment - Please eliminate the use of the word disparate treatment – it is confusing Jargon and
no one will no what you are talking about}

6

The hazard function can be represented by a standard normal cumulative distribution function.

log it ( P1 ( w j ; β )) = log[ P1 ( w j ; β ) /(1 − P1 ( w j ; β ))] = w′j β
In equation (5), the underlying assumption is that the probability P1 ( w j ; β ) approaches zero and one at
the same rate i.e. the link is symmetric. However, as explained before, a disparate treatment exists. An
alternative is complimentary log-log or the proportional hazard link function, which is:
− log(− log(1 − P1 ( w j ; β ))) = w′j β or, P1 ( w j ; β ) = 1 − exp(− exp( w′j β )) with

P1 ( w j ; β ) approaching one faster than zero. See Clarke, Courchane, and Roy (2005).
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Specifically, we will adopt discrete time proportional hazard model as our link function7 and
estimate the likelihood of law adoption using the following model (Kiefer, 1988; de Figueiredo
and Vanden Bergh, 2004)

λ j (t ) = λ0 (t ) exp(γZ jt )

(4)

where i(t) represents the hazard of law adoption for a state that has not yet adopted the law and
λ

the probability of a state adopting the law in one period conditional on not having adopted it
previously is

[

Pr[ S jt = 1 | γZ jt , S jt −1 = 0] = E S jt − S jt −1 | γZ jt

]

(5)

The estimated probability of a given quarter-year t being in state j’s event window is simply
s

E[ S jt − S jt − s | γˆZ jt , γˆZ jt −1 ,..., γˆZ jt − s ] = ∑ Pr[ S jt − s + u = 1 | γZ jt − s + u , S jt − s +u −1 = 0]

(6)

u =1

which is used as the propensity score for every quarter-year in each state or in the MSA’s for each
the state.

We employ a Kernel Matching method where each treatment observation or MSA-quarter year is
matched with a weighted average of all control units where weights are calculated as inverse of
the Euclidean distance between the propensity scores of the two units.8 The Kernal Matching
method efficiently uses all information to form a control or benchmark for each treatment
observation, which is important when some treatment observations have few control or
comparison observations with similar propensity scores.

Finally, we verify that for each

treatment observation the weighted average of the observed state attributes Xjt for control
7

Obviously, many complex extensions exist to the traditional proportional Hazard model. However,
propensity score estimation is very robust to misspecification in the link function and so is typically
conducted with very simple link functions such as the proportional hazard model in our case and logit or
probit in traditional applications (Dehejia and Wahba, 1999).
8
Traditionally, the score is used to divide the sample into equally spaced intervals or bins, and within each
bin a test is conducted for whether the average propensity score of treated and control units do not differ
statistically. If it differs, the interval split again until the condition is satisfied. With Kernel Matching all
treated are matched with a weighted average of all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to
the distance between the propensity scores of treated and controls.
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observations does not differ statistically observation from the state attributes for the treatment
observation. The estimation is carried out in the common support region. Common support

refers to overlapping distributions of their characteristics. The major advantage of
propensity score approaches compared to traditional regression-based methods is that
regression hides the common support problem, because it does not quantify the
similarities (or dissimilarities) between the two groups.

Finally, we calculate the average difference between outcomes (i.e. percentage change in HPI) of
the treatment/event window MSA-quarter years and the weighted average of control quarter year
HPI as described in equation (3).

2.3 Adapting the Event Study Methodology
An event study aims to estimate the “abnormal return” that occurs during an event window that
immediately follows the event - the difference between the expected price of an asset based on
benchmark appreciation rates following the event and the observed price in the end of the event
window. The following scheme outlines the modified event study procedure:

Event:

Adoption of the property condition disclosure law

Outcome Variable:

quarterly HPI growth rate

Event Window:

16 quarters before and 16 quarters after the adoption of the law.

Sample:

MSAs in 50 US states – 34 states adopted the law.

Notations:

Event time = 0;
Pre-event time periods = -1,…, -16; Post-event time periods = +1,…, +16
HPI growth rate for treated MSA= hT
HPI growth rate for control MSA= hC
Abnormal Return = AR
Cumulative Abnormal Return = CAR
MSAs = k;

Treated MSAs = i;
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Control MSAs = j;

i ,j ∈ k

Event Time-line:
---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|----------|---------|---------|-----------16

-12

-8

-4

0

+4

+8

+12

+16

Step-1: Estimating Propensity Score Model using equation (6). The estimated propensity score
is obtained for each MSA in each quarter-year.

Step-2:

For each treated MSA in respective event date, we find the closest match from the

group of control MSAs in terms of the estimated propensity score. So, the HPI growth
rate of matched control MSA would be the benchmark from which we calculate the
deviations of the actual return or HPI growth rate of the treated MSA for each time
period in the event window.

Step-3:

Calculating the Abnormal Returns (AR): For a given treated MSA, i, and a matched

control MSA, j, we obtain:

(

ARi−16 = hiT, −16 − h Cj, −16
.

(

ARi0 = hiT, 0 − h Cj, 0
.

(

)

)

ARi+16 = hiT, +16 − h Cj, +16

)

We calculate the average (across treated MSAs) abnormal returns for each event date.

Step-4:

Calculation of Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR): It is calculated as the cumulative

aggregation of the average ARs. For example, for a three period CAR (i.e. within one period of

[

]

the event date), we obtain - CAR = ARi−1 + ARi0 + ARi+1 .

3 Data Description
The study uses information on economic variables and institutional variables for 291 MSAs in 50
US States from 1984 to 2004. For the MSA level analysis, we utilize the quarterly information i.e.
24,444 observations. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has changed the definition of
MSAs a few times during the study period. Since, OFHEO uses 2003 MSA definition to compute
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the housing price index; we use 2003 MSA definition for our analysis. Since, our treatment
variable is the adoption of disclosure law, which is state-mandated, we discard the MSAs, which
cross the state boundaries, and we discard the consolidated MSAs.

To our knowledge, 34 states have already mandated some form of disclosure statement. We
obtained the effective dates of the mandate from official statements for each state.9 To estimate
the housing price changes, we use the repeat sales quarterly Housing Price Index (HPI), reported
by the OFHEO. We use quarterly percentage change in HPI in MSA level analysis. For yearly
analysis, we take the average quarterly rate of change for the year. This is the case with the
propensity score matching analyses. One important advantage of the time period is that on
average, we can observe the treated units sufficiently before and after the adoption of the
disclosure law for most of the states. In our sample, California, being the first state, adopted the
law in 1987, while the majority of other 33 states adopted the law in 1990s.

3.1 Economic Variables:
We use labor market characteristics like the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate and the job
growth rate, which are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In order to comply with
2003 MSA definition, we use county labor market information to aggregate up to the MSA level.
Other economic variables include percentage change in per capita income, percentage change in
per capita Gross State Product (GSP), and the population growth rate, which are obtained from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We also include single-family 30-year average
mortgage rates for states. Per capita Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) data is not publicly
available. We compute MSA share of GSP to use it as a proxy for GMP10. United States
Conference of Mayors and the National Association of Counties publish GMP data from 1997.

9

Pancak et al. (1996) lists the states, which adopted the disclosure law until 1996.
Proxy GMP=GSP*(MSA population/State population).

10
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Comparing with the United States Conference of Mayors and the National Association of
Counties’ GMP data, we find that our proxy is close to the official estimates. Moreover, we are
interested in the variation in per capita GMP. The economic variables with the exception of the
labor market controls are available on a yearly basis. We interpolate these variables to the
quarterly level11. Broadly, these variables characterize the economic make-up of each
metropolitan area.

3.2 Institutional Variables:
Numerous lawsuits against the real estate licensees made the case for adoption of disclosure laws.
Presumably the legal activities are influenced by the institutional characteristics of the state.
Statistics from the Digest of Real Estate Licensing Laws and Current Issues (reports from 1985 to
2005) compiled by the Association of Real Estate Licensing Law Officials (ARELLO) provide a
rich set of characteristics that are closely associated with the institutional backdrop of the
disclosure law. For example, the number of complaints against real estate licensees indicates the
level of dissatisfaction with licensee provided service. Similarly, the number of disciplinary
actions taken against the licensees provides information about how the monitoring authority
performs its duty.12 Other institutional controls include number of active brokers, associate
brokers, and salespersons in each state and the broker supervision. In fact, it was the concerted

11

Since linear interpolation takes two yearly values and fits a straight line while projecting the
data in between, it is generally less accurate than other polynomial based methods. So, we apply a
cubic spline interpolation method, which uses the data point value along with the first and the
second derivatives at each surrounding point to interpolate. When we compare the results with
interpolated quarterly data with the actual yearly data, the qualitative results do not differ.
12

When disciplinary actions figure is missing or zero, we take the average of the figures within 1year range. When total disciplinary actions figure is missing in ARELLO reports, if available, we
take the sum of the figures under different categories of disciplinary actions, or, we take the sum
of the actions by consent and number of formal hearing as total number of disciplinary actions
(this is the case until 1986). Then we take sum of disciplinary action and formal hearing from
column of complaints resulting in some actions. Both of these are expected to provide the number
of complaints having enough substance to attract legal attention. This is typically the case with
Arizona and Hawaii for 1984 to 1986.
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movement and lobbying on the part of realtor’s association, which moved law onto the agenda of
in many state legislatures. In order to control for the organization of real estate agents in different
states, we include the number of active brokers, associate brokers, and salespersons in each state
in our analysis.13 We also include a measure of the extent of broker supervision in our analysis.
Pancak and Sirmans (2005) expect that “greater supervision would prevent intentional and
unintentional wrong doing on the part of salespersons, and therefore decrease findings of
misconduct”. These variables broadly characterize the institutional make-up of the real estate
market.
We also include a control for partisan control in the state legislation. Following de
Figueiredo and Vanden Bergh (2004), we include an indicator variable for democratic and
republican control. In order to fully exploit the information on political make-up of the state
general assembly, we use detailed partisan control variables rather than a simple blue/red
category. We used indicator variables capturing Democratic-Control-Republican-Governor,
Democratic-Control-Democratic-Governor,

Republican-Control-Republican-Governor,

Republican-Control-Democratic-Governor. The information on partisan control for each general
election cycle is obtained from National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL).

Table (1) reports the summary statistics of the above controls for the treated and the control units.
A few important observations can be made based on the summary statistics. Both at the MSA
level as well as the state level, average percentage change in HPI is slightly higher (1.13 percent
against 1.01 percent for MSAs, and 1.22 percent against 1.06 percent for States) for the treated
group than for the control group. Unemployment rate and other economic controls are generally
higher for the control units. Remarkably, average number of disciplinary actions (about 134
against 51) and average number of complaints (about 860 against 737) are higher for the states,
13

Ideally, the percentage of licensees who are associated with some trade organizations like National
Association of Realtors (NAR) could serve as an excellent indicator of the lobbying effort. However, it is
hard to obtain this information across the states for the long time series required for this study.
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which adopted disclosure law, but this may arise in part from high levels preceding adoption.
Generally, the higher number of disciplinary actions and complaints against the licensees in
treatment states suggest that these controls are important in capturing the dissatisfaction of the
consumers, and also due to high volume of complaints, regulators might be inclined to a statemandated disclosure requirement. On average, control units tend to have greater broker
supervision (51 percent against 48 percent) than the treated units. This supports the hypothesis
that greater broker supervision ensures less mistakes and greater awareness of the market
practices among salespersons, which, in turn, tend to reduce the dissatisfaction among the
homeowners. The disclosure states tend to have higher number of active licensees. Interestingly,
the treated states are more likely to be under republican control than under democratic control,
but this may result from the important role of the industry in lobbying for seller disclosure laws as
opposed to traditional consumer protection groups.

4 Empirical Results
We discussed the slow adjustment process of the legal shock in the section (2). To get a sense of
the “speed” of the adjustment process we use equation (1) i.e. the regression model that allows for
MSA and time effects, and specify the length of legal dummy to be single quarter, four quarters,
eight quarters and, up to thirty-six quarters or nine years. We try two ways to test the robustness
of the outcome. First, we keep the sample size same for all the lengths limiting our sample to
states that adopted the law at least nine years prior to the end of our sample period. Next, we
adjust the sample size as we increase the length so that shorter event windows allow the inclusion
of states that adopted the law closer to the end of our sample. In figure (2), we plot the estimates
on legal dummy variable from different specifications in terms of lengths of law adjustment.
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Figure 2 Plot of the Estimates
The analysis reveals significant effects when we assume long-term persistence in the shock. The
effect is most pronounced in 4 to 6 years of windows. This is quite consistent with the theoretical
hypothesis in figure (1). Figure (2) appears to suggest that the estimate is almost zero when we
specify the length as 8 to 9 years, however, figure 2 is based on quarterly appreciation rates. In
order to get the actual effect size of the event, we need to multiply the estimates in figure 2 with
the corresponding number of quarters that we specify as the event window.
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Figure 3 Plot of the Actual Effect Sizes
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For example, in figure (2), the effect is about 0.167 per quarter for the model with 4 years (or 16
quarters) of length of persistence where we use the adjusted sample. Therefore, the actual effect is
2.67 (= 0.167*16). We plot the actual effect size in figure (3). Figure (3) reveals that the effect
size decreases gradually and is not zero in 8 to 9 years of adjustment lengths. It suggests that the
effect of the law on property values is generally spread over about four to six years. Therefore,
we treat the adoption of the law as an event that creates “abnormal returns” for four years
following the event.14

4.1 Parametric Results
Results for equations (1) are reported in table (2) for the MSA level analysis. Column (1) reports
estimates that only control for quarter-year fixed effects while columns (2) and (3) report the
estimates after including state and MSA fixed effects respectively. The estimated impact of law
adoption is fairly stable across the three models. The estimate of 0.167 differential appreciation
rates from column (3) is the figure used in figure (2) for an event window of 4 years. Multiplying
this effect by 16 quarters yields a 2.67 (= 0.167*16) percent increase in asset values during the
event window relative to the market benchmark.

Results from feasible GLS procedure are reported in table (3). As discussed before, feasible GLS
procedure provides improvement (in terms of efficiency gain) over pooled regressions when we
specify the error structure. The estimated effect size in table (3) column (3) is nearly identical to
the 2.67 percent increase in asset values from column (3) in Table (2).

14

Similar results are obtained using a six year event window.
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4.2 Propensity Score Estimates
Propensity scores are obtained from a proportional hazard model with economic and institutional
variables as described in Nanda (2008). Virtually all our data is annual so that there is almost no
variation in propensity scores across quarters. Therefore, this analysis is done with yearly data at
the MSA level i.e. information about 291 MSAs for 21 years although annual appreciation rates
are divided by four to be comparable to quarterly rates used in Tables (2) and (3) 15. We look at
the effects with three different estimators: (1) a simple average difference in percentage change in
HPI that does not control for cross-section and time effects; (2) an average difference in
percentage change in HPI after controlling for the year effect; and (3) a differences in differences
estimate based on removing year and MSA fixed effects. Estimator (1) is simply the difference in
Average HPI rate between the treatment and control groups, state quarter-years that fall in or
outside of each states event window. Estimator (2) is obtained from estimator (1) after controlling
for the year effect so that the outcome variable is a quarter-year’s deviation from average
appreciation in that quarter-year across the entire sample. Estimator (3) is defined as difference
between average HPI deviation for a quarter year (after controlling for year affects) between
treated and control groups compared to the difference between the treated and control groups’
average HPI deviation from a year before the disclosure law was adopted, where the year before
adoption provides a market benchmark. Since there are some MSAs, which have missing values
on the HPI in early years of the sample period, we use earliest available HPI rate as the
benchmark. However, we make sure that the benchmark is from a year prior to adoption of the
disclosure law. This leaves us with 286 MSAs for the analysis.

15

While conducting the yearly analysis, we test alternative specifications for the timing of the law
adoption. Since we know the effective day of the mandate, we could assign the corresponding
year as the adoption year. However, one could argue that if the effective date falls in last two
quarters of the year, bulk of home sales has already taken place. Therefore, the effectiveness of
the mandate really starts from next year. We tried both the specifications. The qualitative and
quantitative results are robust to this concern.
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Table (4) reveals the results from semi-parametric propensity score matching analysis with kernel
matching. The estimated effect size falls between 1.59 and 3.50 percent. Column (3) of table (4)
reveals about 3.50 percent (i.e. 0.219*16= 3.50, for 16 quarters) significant and positive effect at
the MSA level, which is higher than 2.67 percent that we found in column (3) of tables (2) and
(3).

The first column does not involve any controls for differentials in the national rates of

housing price appreciation during periods shortly after the adoption of laws in many states and
other periods of time. Therefore, in our view, the results in columns (2) and (3) which fall
between 3.30 and 3.50 percent are our best estimates that are most directly comparable to the
parametric estimates in Table (2).

4.3 Analysis of Abnormal Returns
In the propensity score matching estimation, the control unit may come from any of the periods in
the sample. However, it may be desirable to find a matched control from the disclosure year or
from the vicinity of that time period. To address this concern, we restrict the control unit to be
obtained within one year of the law adoption. This is done in an event study approach as laid out
in section (2.3). The abnormal returns or ARs are obtained as the deviation of the treatment unit’s
HPI growth rate from the control unit’s HPI growth rate at each event dates, which are lined up as
different states adopted the law at different dates. The control units are obtained by matching on
the estimated propensity scores. We apply the restriction of obtaining matches within one year of
the event date. Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated as the sample average cumulative
abnormal return for 16 th quarter to the specified quarter.

Table (5) reports the results from an event study analysis at the MSA level. We calculate the
cumulative abnormal returns for 33 quarters i.e. 16 quarters before and a fter the event date. The
analysis suggests about 2.6 percent increase in house prices due to adoption of the Property
Condition Disclosure Law. On average, the event date abnormal return is positive. Almost 50
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percent of the abnormal return estimates are positive on the event date and on other dates in the
event window. The percentage of positive abnormal returns is slightly higher in the post-event
time periods than in the pre-event dates.

AR,
CAR
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Figure 4 Plot of Cumulative Abnormal Return for Adoption of Disclosure Law

The plot of CARs in figure (4) reveals that the effect of the law increases gradually in the event
window and supports the hypothesis that the initial skepticism about the effectiveness of the law
gradually goes away and the buyers offer higher bid prices for the houses disclosed to be in good
condition.
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5 Conclusion
The study examines the impacts of seller's Property Condition Disclosure mandate on the
residential real estate values. We analyze the effect of information transparency and the shift of
risk from buyers and brokers to the sellers due to adoption of the law on property values. The
analytical structure employs parametric panel data models, semi-parametric propensity score
matching models, and an event study framework using a rich set of economic and institutional
variables for a quarterly panel of 291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and a yearly
panel of 50 US States spanning 21 years from 1984 to 2004 to address the research question.

Analyzing the MSA level variation in Housing Price Indices, we find a positive effect of the
seller’s Property Condition Disclosure Law on property values, and the effect is spread over
about four years. We suggest using semi-parametric approaches due to absence of any a priori
distributional assumption, and comparison based on similar units. Moreover, we show that
compared to parametric event study, the propensity score effects are somewhat larger in size. The
results suggest that the average seller may be able to fetch a higher price (about three to four
percent) for the house if she furnishes a state-mandated seller’s Property Condition Disclosure
statement to the buyer. The state-mandated disclosure requirement ensures widespread
compliance. The plausible reasons behind this premium could be the buyer’s greater confidence
in the quality of the house she is acquiring, and the higher quality of the houses up for sale. The
Property Condition Disclosure Law brings about the much-desired transparency in housing
transactions, which increases the prospective homeowners’ confidence. The finding is consistent
with the generally held postulate by real estate agents and scholars about the favorable impact of
the law on average house prices.
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Table 1 Summary Statistics
Disclosure Mandate
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

No Disclosure Mandate
N

Mean

Std. Dev.

291 Metropolitan Statistical Areas Characteristics: 1984Q1—2004Q4: 24,444 Observations
%Change in HPI16

17,189

1.127

2.186

4,615

1.012

2.046

%Unemployment Rate

19,068

8.660

9.227

5,376

10.254

15.976

%Job Growth Rate

19,068

0.443

4.081

5,376

0.556

2.352

%Per Capita Income Change

19,068

5.619

3.103

5,376

6.207

2.943

%Per Capita GMP Growth
Rate
%Population Growth Rate

19,068

1.142

0.741

5,376

1.128

0.657

19,068

0.292

0.387

5,376

0.373

0.412

50 States Characteristics: 1984—2004: 1,050 Observations
%Change in HPI

714

1.225

1.299

336

1.059

0.937

%Unemployment Rate

714

5.532

1.682

336

5.583

1.875

%Job Growth Rate

714

1.536

1.891

336

1.622

1.983

%Per Capita Income Change

714

1.391

0.644

336

1.416

0.774

%Per Capita GSP Growth Rate

714

4.861

3.434

336

4.766

3.163

%Population Growth Rate

714

1.058

1.093

336

0.979

1.185

%Mortgage Rate

714

8.432

1.784

336

8.434

1.773

Number of Real Estate
Licensees/1000 population
No. of Complaints

714

6.144

2.810

336

5.991

4.511

714

860.112

1465.934

336

737.382

2465.497

No. of Disciplinary Actions

714

134.243

267.121

336

50.767

53.126

Licensee
Supervision Index
Democratic Control
Democratic Governor
Democratic Control
Republican Governor
Republican Control
Republican Governor
Republican Control
Democratic Governor

714

47.555

26.202

336

50.529

25.585

714

0.225

0.418

336

0.277

0.448

714

0.224

0.417

336

0.241

0.428

714

0.293

0.455

336

0.259

0.438

714

0.258

0.437

336

0.223

0.417

16

The number of observations differs for HPI due to missing information for some MSAs in early
years.
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Table 2 Parametric Event Study: Fixed Effect Analysis at the MSA Level
(Dependent Variable: Percent Change in HPI from previous quarter)
Regressors
(1)
(2)
(3)
Law Adoption

0.251*
(0.056)

0.196*
(0.057)

0.167*
(0.054)

Mortgage Rate

0.327*
(0.112)

0.751*
(0.130)

0.758*
(0.131)

%Unemployment

-0.009*
(0.003)

-0.006**
(0.002)

-0.003
(0.003)

%Job Growth

0.003
(0.006)

0.003
(0.006)

0.003
(0.006)

%Per Capita Income
Change

0.073*
(0.011)

0.077*
(0.011)

0.081*
(0.011)

%Per Capita GMP Growth
Rate

0.115*
(0.039)

0.082**
(0.040)

0.081**
(0.039)

%Population Growth Rate

0.611*
(0.096)

0.782*
(0.092)

1.351*
(0.112)

Democratic Control
Democratic Governor

0.051
(0.064)

0.241*
(0.069)

0.221*
(0.069)

Republican Control
Republican Governor

-0.029
(0.054)

0.084
(0.061)

0.101
(0.060)

Democratic Control
Republican Governor

-0.073
(0.052)

0.018
(0.071)

-0.011
(0.070)

Number of Real Estate
Licensees/1000 population

0.009
(0.007)

-0.042*
(0.016)

-0.044*
(0.017)

% Disciplinary Action taken
/ number of complaints

-0.062
(0.061)

0.076
(0.088)

0.073
(0.088)

Licensee
Supervision Index

-0.008*
(0.001)

-0.009*
(0.002)

-0.009*
(0.002)

Fixed Effects
Joint Significance
of Time Effects

Time Only
F (83, 290) =36.95
(Pr= 0.00)

Joint Significance
of Cross-Section Effects

Time & State Time & MSA
F (83, 290)
= 36.67
(Pr= 0.00)

F (83, 290)
= 35.69
(Pr= 0.00)

F (48, 290) =
20.72
(Pr= 0.00)

F (60, 290)
=88236.11
(Pr= 0.00)

Adj. R2

0.107

0.128

0.143

N

19,994

19,994

19,944
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Table 3 Parametric: Feasible GLS Procedure: MSA
(Dependent Variable: Percent Change in HPI from previous quarter)
Regressors
(1)
(2)
(3)

Law Adoption

0.184
(0.116)

0.191**
(0.082)

0.167**
(0.080)

Time &
MSA

Time &
MSA

Time &
MSA

Yes

Yes

Yes

Fixed Effects

Panel
Heteroscedasticity

No AR

Error Structure

N

19,491

Same
Panel Specific
AR(1)
AR(1)
Across Panels
19,491

19,490

Table 4 Semi-Parametric Event Study: Average Treatment Effect
Propensity Score Matching Estimation
Kernel Matching Estimators

Treatment Effect

(1)
Average Difference

(2)
Average Difference
Year FE

(3)
DID-Benchmark

0.099*
(0.038)

0.206*
(0.033)

0.219*
(0.079)

NOTES: Treatment is the law adoption. Outcome is the percent change in average quarterly HPI from the
previous year to current year (year-over-year change). Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in
parentheses. ‘*’, ‘**’, and ‘***’ imply 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance level.
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Table 5 An Improvised Event Study of the Adoption of Disclosure Law
Event Date/
Quarter

Abnormal Return
(AR)

Positive ARs
%

33-Quarter
CAR

-16

0.606*
(0.251)
-0.111
(0.309)
0.047
(0.285)
0.525**
(0.273)
-0.046
(0.250)
0.090
(0.199)
-0.049
(0.201)
0.182
(0.178)
0.367***
(0.207)
-0.255
(0.165)
0.095
(0.167)
-0.225
(0.167)
-0.118
(0.170)
0.255
(0.163)
0.007
(0.161)
-0.279
(0.163)
0.256**
(0.141)
0.053
(0.126)
-0.271
(0.153)
-0.101
(0.178)
-0.140
(0.178)
0.164
(0.159)
-0.008
(0.149)
0.390*
(0.157)
0.111
(0.131)
0.001
(0.156)
0.224***
(0.135)
0.028
(0.140)
-0.044
(0.127)
0.240***
(0.141)
0.352*
(0.119)
-0.132
(0.126)

52

0.606

44

0.495

54

0.542

52

1.067

42

1.021

-0.046

51

1.111

0.044

50

1.062

-0.005

52

1.244

0.177

55

1.611

0.544

0.367

43

1.356

0.289

0.112

51

1.451

0.384

0.207

43

1.226

0.159

-0.018

48

1.108

0.041

-0.135

-0.118

52

1.363

0.296

0.119

0.137

43

1.370

0.303

0.126

0.144

46

1.090

0.023

-0.153

-0.136

50

1.346

0.279

0.103

0.120

46

1.401

0.333

0.156

0.174

44

1.128

0.061

-0.115

-0.098

46

1.029

-0.038

-0.215

-0.197

44

0.888

-0.179

-0.355

-0.338

52

1.052

-0.015

-0.192

49

1.044

-0.023

-0.199

57

1.434

0.367

0.191

50

1.545

0.478

0.302

50

1.545

0.478

60

1.769

0.702

48

1.797

0.730

49

1.753

0.686

50

1.993

55

2.345

47

2.213

-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

31

25-Quarter
CAR

17-Quarter
CAR

9-Quarter
CAR

16

0.086
(0.134)

57

2.299

32

